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Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0210 
RE: State v. Hittle, Case No. 20020504-SC (On Writ of Certiorari) 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
I write pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to advise the Court of 
a published opinion overlooked by the parties' briefs which may bear on this Court's decision 
concerning the Petition for Writ of Certiorari currently pending in the above case. 
State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), is not a new opinion, but is not cited in the 
parties" briefs (case copy is attached). The opinion encompasses several issues, and includes a 
lengthy discussion concerning Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The majority opinion 
characterizes the State's argument as advocating that "otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial court violates any provision of Rule 11." 717 P.2d 
at 1301. The majority then states that, notwithstanding the concurring opinions of two Justices 
which adopt the State's reasoning, the position "is shortsighted, for to follow it would be to 
sanction a remedy far worse than the wrong." Id. The majority then describes the unavoidable 
result of such reasoning and rejects the State's position. Id. This opinion is directly relevant to 
the first Point in the State's opening brief in the instant case. 
Should you have any questions, please call me at 366-0180. 
Sincerely 
rts C. Leonard 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Margaret Lindsay, attorney for petitioner 
enc. 
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STATE of Utah. Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Douglas Edward KAY, Defendant and Appellant. 
No 20265, 
March?, 1986. ' 
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1986. 
Defendant, who pled guilty to three counts of 
capital homicide in exchange for promise that he 
would be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than 
death, appealed from Riling of the Fifth District 
Court, Washington County, J. Harlan Bums, J., that 
court was not bound by the agreement to impose 
life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, I , held that: (1) acceptance of 
conditional plea was not improper under rule 
governing guilty pleas; (2) trial court's participation 
in plea negotiations in violation of rule governing 
guilty pleas did not require that the pleas be 
declared a nullity; but (3) trial court's decision not 
to enforce agreed-upon sentence and to offer 
defendant option of standing on guilty pleas and 
proceeding with sentencing hearing with no 
guarantee as to sentence or standing 
reinstated pleas of not guilty was proper. 
Remanded. 
I lall, C.J., and Howe, J., filed opinions concurring 
in the result. 
Stewart, J., filed opinion concurring in the result 
and concurring in the opinion in part. 
\ \ \Kf He.i'ln J i " 
[1] Sentencing and Punishment ^~ 
350Hkl778 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110kl208.1(6)) 
Bifurcated death sentencing procedure was 
instituted to ensure that if a defendant is found 
guilty and then sentenced to death, sentence will 
withstand scrutiny under both State and Federal 
Constitutions, with statute's aim being to eliminate 
arbitrariness of decision to impose death by 
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requiring court or jury to carefully weigh specific 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances before 
deciding upon appropriate sentence. I i.C. A. 1.953, 
76-3-206, 76-3- 207,,, 
[2] Sentencing and Punishment €=>1740 
350Hkl 740 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110kl208.1(6)) 
Nothing in statute governing imposition of death 
penalty" [U.C.A.1953, 76-3^ 207(1-3)], prevents 
prosecutor from refusing to put on evidence of 
aggravating circumstances, thus effectively ensuring 
that defendant will not receive death penalty. 
H| Criminal Law €=>273.1(2) 
: ink2^ 1<7« Mi.si «"ned Cases 
Although statute governing imposition of death 
penalty^ [U.C.A.1953, 76-3- 207(1-3)] requires 
sentencing hearing to be held, nothing precludes the 
trial court from agreeing m advance, under terms of 
a proper plea agreement, to impose a particular 
sentence. 
[4] C< mrts €=>85(2) 
106k85(2) Most Cited Cases 
It had to be assumed that primary purpose of state 
criminal procedure rule patterned after federal 
criminal procedure nlie was the same as that of the 
federal rule, 
[*^ | i ; tun-.-it i.aw -^273.1.4. 
,
.!Ok2"'3 1(4) Most Cited C ases 
Primary purpose of I IX. A. 1953, 77-35-11, 
governing guilty pleas, is to ensure that when 
defendant enters a guilty plea and thereby waives 
important constitutional rights, such as the right to a 
jury trial, he acts freely and voluntarily, with fiill 
knowledge of the consequences of the plea. 
[6| Criminal Law C=>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Secondary purpose of U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11, 
governing guilty pleas, is to preserve the integrity of 
the judicial process by ensuring that the record 
reflects that the plea was properly taken. 
j/"j i i iiin.iui i.au •—-._vu-4; 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
•
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Accused. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11(e)(6), requiring judge to 
inform defendant that judge is not bound by any 
recommendations of the prosecutor as to sentence, 
ensures that prosecutor cannot limit trial judge's 
authority in sentencing, but does not prohibit judge 
from independently exercising his discretion to 
commit himself to imposing a particular sentence as 
a condition of a plea agreement. 
[8] Criminal Law €=>273.1(2) 
110k273.1(2) Most Cited Cases 
Acceptance of guilty plea conditioned upon 
imposition of nondeath penalty was proper under 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11, governing guilty pleas, 
where record left no question that pleas were 
voluntary, with defendant vigorously arguing that 
the pleas were freely and knowingly given in effort 
to avoid death penalty. 
[9] Criminal Law €^273.1(1) 
110k273.1(1) Most Cited Cases 
Mere fact that defendant pled guilty to avoid 
harsher penalty did not render otherwise valid plea 
involuntary. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11. 
[10] Criminal Law €=>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Rule governing guilty pleas [U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-11] would not be read to prohibit acceptance 
of conditional guilty plea. 
[11] Criminal Law €==>273.1(2) 
110k273.1(2) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's unilateral participation in plea 
negotiation over prosecutor's objection is highly 
improper. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11. 
[12] Criminal Law €==>273.1(2) 
110k273.1(2) Most Cited Cases 
Violation of U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11, governing 
guilty pleas, by trial judge's participation in plea 
negotiations did not require that guilty plea be 
declared a nullity, despite State's assertions that 
court unilaterally participated in plea negotiation 
over prosecutor's objection, where State's attorneys 
were present during all discussions on plea, nothing 
Copr. O West 2003 No < 
in the record suggested that the State did not 
acquiesce in the agreement, and the record did not 
suggest that court's actions coerced defendant into 
reluctantly entering guilty pleas. 
[13] Criminal Law €^273.1(1) 
110k273.1 (1) Most Cited Cases 
Otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty pleas should 
not always be voided when trial court violates any 
provision of U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11, governing 
guilty pleas. 
[14] Criminal Law €==>n66(3) 
11 Ok 1166(3) Most Cited Cases 
Violation of U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11, governing 
guilty pleas, will not invalidate the plea taken unless 
the error results in a substantial violation of a party's 
rights, under the harmless error rule, U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-30(a). 
[151 Criminal Law €=^273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
State waived its objections to taking of guilty plea 
in violation of U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11, governing 
guilty pleas, by failing to raise the objections at the 
time when the pleas were accepted. 
[16] Criminal Law €=>273.1(2) 
110k273.1(2) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's refusal to enforce conditional guilty 
pleas, which were offered to court and accepted 
without prosecutor's agreement and which provided 
that defendant should not receive death sentence, 
and court's offer to defendant of option of 
proceeding with sentencing hearing with no 
guarantee as to sentence or standing trial on 
reinstated pleas of not guilty were proper. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11. (Per Zimmerman, J., with 
one Justice concurring and the Chief Justice and 
two Justices concurring in result.) 
*1295 R. Clayton Huntsman, Phillip Lang 
Foremaster, St. George, for defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Earl J. Dorius, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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Defendant Douglas Kay appeals from the trial 
court's refusal to adhere to the terms of a plea 
bargain. He pleaded guilty to three counts of 
capital homicide in exchange for a promise that he 
would be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than 
death. The trial court accepted the pleas without 
objection from the State. Two weeks later, 
following a change in the State's position, the court 
ruled that it was not bound by the agreement to 
impose life imprisonment. The court gave Kay the 
option of being sentenced, with the possibility of 
receiving the death sentence, or withdrawing his 
guilty pleas. Kay took an interlocutory appeal and 
seeks specific enforcement of the plea bargain. He 
alleges not only that principles of double jeopardy 
*1296 preclude the court from setting the pleas 
aside and forcing him to begin the process anew, 
but also that the trial court's actions violated his 
constitutional right to due process. For reasons 
unique to the facts of this case, we find no 
constitutional infirmity in the trial court's setting 
aside the condition of the pleas. The case therefore 
is remanded. Kay may withdraw his pleas of guilty 
or he may proceed to sentencing. 
This appeal presents several issues. The first is 
whether the Utah statute governing the sentencing 
of capital felons, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207 
(Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978, & Supp.1985), permits a 
defendant to plead guilty to a capital felony in 
exchange for a promise of life imprisonment. The 
second issue is whether a violation of Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, § 
77-35-11 (Repl.Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp.l985)--either 
because of the trial judge's participation in the plea 
process or because the plea was conditional in 
nature-requires the plea to be set aside. The third 
issue is whether the acceptance of a plea agreement 
that is subsequently broken places a defendant in 
jeopardy and precludes trial. Finally, we must 
determine what constraints due process places on 
the State when it seeks to breach a plea agreement. 
We hold that neither the statute governing the 
sentencing of capital felons nor Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure prevented Kay from 
entering and the trial judge from accepting the 
conditional plea presented here. We hold that the 
trial judge did violate the procedural requirements 
of Rule 11 when he accepted Kay's unilateral plea, 
but find that the violation did not render the plea 
agreement invalid. We also hold that while Kay 
was placed in jeopardy within the meaning of the 
Copr. © West 2003 No C 
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
the trial judge was entitled to rescind his acceptance 
of the agreement under the circumstances of this 
case, and neither double jeopardy nor due process 
considerations bar the State from proceeding to trial. 
The facts leading up to this appeal are relatively 
simple. Kay is charged with three counts of first 
degree murder, all capital felonies, and four counts 
of aggravated robbery, all first degree felonies. 
These charges arose out of the execution-style 
shooting deaths of three people during the robbery 
of a bar in Cedar City, Utah, in February of 1984. 
[FN1] Kay was arraigned on April 17, 1984, and 
again on May 8th. A number of pretrial motions 
were presented throughout the summer. The trial 
was originally scheduled for August 13, 1984, but 
at the State's request, was continued until September 
17th. 
FN1. Three other defendants were 
involved in the robbery. The State 
granted immunity to two of them in 
exchange for their testimony against Kay 
and the remaining defendant. 
Three weeks before trial, defendant's counsel 
presented the court with an "In- Camera Motion for 
Conditional Plea of Guilty" in which Kay offered to 
plead guilty to all counts and to give his confession 
in open court in exchange for a promise by the 
judge that he would not be sentenced to death. 
Although the State had two days' notice that Kay 
intended to enter a conditional plea, it was unaware 
of the terms of the proposed plea until the motion 
was presented to the court. 
The motion was presented to the court in chambers 
and was discussed at length off the record. The 
judge, defendant's counsel, the Iron County 
attorney, and a Utah assistant attorney general were 
all present. A one-hour recess was then called to 
allow the State to consider the matter and to allow 
defense counsel to consult with Kay. Following 
another brief in camera session with all counsel, 
proceedings were held on the record. The court 
questioned Kay at length about his understanding of 
both the plea agreement and its consequences and 
concluded that the pleas were knowingly and 
voluntarily given. Kay then pleaded guilty to each 
to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works 
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count of capital homicide "on the condition that 
[his] life not be forfeited," pleaded guilty to all four 
counts of aggravated robbery, and gave a full 
confession on the record, describing the robbery 
*1297 and the murders in detail. The trial judge 
accepted the pleas and scheduled a sentencing 
hearing for September 17, 1984. At no time did 
the prosecution object in open court to the pleas or 
to any other aspect of the proceedings. 
Two weeks later, the State asked the trial court to 
reconsider its acceptance of the conditional pleas. 
This motion was made after a new lawyer appeared 
as lead counsel for the State, after the details of 
Kay's confession had been widely reported in the 
media, and after several public demonstrations in 
Cedar City had protested the agreement to sentence 
Kay to life imprisonment. One such incident 
involved parading an effigy of Kay crowned with 
the head of a dead pig through the town with a 
placard calling for the recall of the trial judge in the 
upcoming elections. 
Following a lengthy hearing on the State's motion 
to reconsider, the trial judge entered an order 
vacating the promise of life imprisonment. He 
gave several reasons for his action. First, he found 
that the State had been surprised by the original 
motion for the conditional guilty plea, had 
disagreed with the plea agreement (despite its 
failure to object on the record), and had not had 
sufficient time to respond to Kay's request for a 
conditional plea. In addition, he found that the 
conditional plea was illegal and that accepting it 
would constitute plain error. The trial judge gave 
Kay the option of standing on the guilty pleas and 
facing a sentencing proceeding at which the death 
penalty might be imposed; withdrawing the guilty 
pleas, reinstating the not guilty pleas, and going to 
trial; or pursuing an interlocutory appeal. Kay 
chose the last alternative. 
In this Court, Kay seeks specific enforcement of 
the plea agreement. Kay asserts that the trial court 
did not exceed its authority in accepting the pleas 
and that, in any event, the State's failure to timely 
object precludes it from challenging them now. He 
argues that the trial court's actions violated his 
constitutional right not to be placed twice in 
jeopardy, as well as his due process right to a fair, 
speedy, and public trial. 
The State contends that the trial judge properly 
Copr. © West 2003 No ( 
vacated the promise of life imprisonment because 
conditional and unilateral pleas are unlawful and 
therefore void under both the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and the death penalty statute. 
In response to Kay's constitutional arguments, the 
State asserts that because the conditional pleas were 
void, Kay was not placed in jeopardy. In addition, 
the State argues that because Kay acted improperly 
in offering the guilty pleas, he cannot now complain 
that the resulting publicity and delay deny him due 
process. 
I 
We first consider Utah's death penalty statute to 
determine whether it permits a trial judge to accept 
a guilty plea conditioned upon the judge's promise 
not to impose the death penalty. In capital cases, 
trials are bifurcated: the defendant's guilt or 
innocence is determined in the first phase, while the 
penalty of death or life imprisonment is determined 
in the second. U.C.A., 1953, §§ 76-3-206 and -207 
(Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978, & Supp.1985). 
This bifurcated scheme was adopted by Utah in 
1973 in response to the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). 
Furman held that the death penalty was prohibited 
by the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of 
the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution when the decision to impose the 
penalty was left to the "uncontrolled discretion of 
judges or juries." 408 U.S. at 253, 92 S.Ct. at 2733 
(Douglas, J., concurring). Following Furman, the 
Georgia legislature amended its death penalty 
statute, bifurcating the guilt and penalty phases and 
specifying detailed standards to guide the fact finder 
in deciding between death and life imprisonment in 
the penalty phase. The Supreme Court reviewed 
this amended statute and held that it was not per se 
unconstitutional. *l298Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 206-07, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2940-41, 49 L.Ed.2d 
859 (1976). The Georgia statute upheld in Gregg 
is essentially identical to Utah's death penalty 
statute, which we have also upheld against 
constitutional challenge. State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 
P.2d 1338, 1345 (1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882, 
99 S.Ct. 219, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978). 
As enacted in 1973, Utah's death penalty statute 
required a separate sentencing proceeding only for 
capital felons found guilty after trial. In 1983, 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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however, the legislature amended the law to require 
a separate sentencing proceeding for those who 
plead guilty, as well as for those who are convicted 
by a judge or jury after trial. 1983 Utah Laws, ch. 
19, § 1; U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1) (Repl.Vol. 
8B, 1978, Supp.1985). No legislative history 
exists to explain this change. 
The language of the sentencing statute, section 
76-3-207, provides as follows: 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been 
found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be 
further proceedings before the court or jury on 
the issue of sentence.... 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may 
be presented as to any matter the court deems 
relevant to sentence, including but not limited to 
the nature and circumstances of the crime, the 
defendant's character, background, history, 
mental and physical condition, and any other facts 
in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. 
(3) [Thereafter, t]he court or jury, as the case may 
be, shall retire to consider the penalty.... 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1), (2), and (3) 
(Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978, Supp.1985) (emphasis added). 
Arguably, this mandate of a hearing requiring 
consideration of the evidence to determine the 
proper sentence is meaningless if the judge can bind 
himself in advance to impose a particular sentence. 
Therefore, the State argues, we should construe the 
statute to preclude the judge from accepting any 
plea that would limit his discretion in the sentencing 
proceeding. This argument is without merit. 
[1] The bifurcated sentencing procedure was 
instituted to insure that if a defendant is found guilty 
and then sentenced to death, the sentence will 
withstand scrutiny under both the state and federal 
constitutions. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). 
The statute's aim was to eliminate the arbitrariness 
of the decision to impose death. It did this by 
requiring the court or the jury to carefully weigh 
specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
before deciding upon the appropriate sentence. Id. 
We can infer that the legislature requires the 
bifurcated proceeding for those who plead guilty to 
capital crimes in order to assure that if the death 
sentence is imposed, it is no more arbitrary than a 
death sentence imposed after a full trial. 
[2] Arguably, allowing the judge to agree to forego 
Copr. & West 2003 No Clai; 
the death penalty without first considering the kind 
of detailed information normally presented at a 
sentencing proceeding renders the sentencing 
scheme unconstitutionally arbitrary. This argument 
is not persuasive. Some discretion is always 
present in the operation of a death penalty statute. 
The prosecution always has discretion to decide 
whom to charge with a capital felony. It may also 
bargain that charge down to a lesser offense, even 
after the charge is filed. Similarly, under our 
sentencing statute, nothing prevents a prosecutor 
from refusing to put on evidence of aggravating 
circumstances, thus effectively insuring that a 
defendant will not receive the death penalty. [FN2] 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(2) (Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978, 
Supp.1985). 
FN2. In some states, prosecutors are 
statutorily required to introduce evidence 
of aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., 
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3(d)(1982ed.). 
[3] Under these circumstances, permitting the trial 
judge to accept a guilty plea conditioned upon an 
agreement not to impose the death penalty does not 
significantly increase the potential for arbitrariness 
in administering the death sentence. It does *1299 
not therefore raise questions of a constitutional 
magnitude under Fur man v. Georgia, supra. 
Although a sentencing hearing must be held, 
nothing in the sentencing statute precludes the trial 
court from agreeing in advance, under the terms of a 
proper plea agreement, to impose a particular 
sentence. In light of these considerations, we find 
that the statute provides no basis for upholding the 
trial court's subsequent withdrawal from the 
agreement. 
II 
[4][5] The State next argues that the trial court's 
failure to comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure renders Kay's bargain invalid. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-11 (Repl.Vol. 8C, 1982, 
Supp.1985). Our Rule 11 is closely patterned after 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
as that rule existed when the Utah rules were first 
formulated. The primary purpose of the federal 
rule and, we must assume, the comparable state 
rule, is to insure that when a defendant enters a 
guilty plea and thereby waives important 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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constitutional rights, such as the nght to a jury trial, 
he or she acts freely and voluntarily, with full 
knowledge of the consequences of the plea E g, 
McCarthy v United States, 394 U S. 459, 465, 89 
S.Ct 1166, 1170, 22 L Ed 2d 418 (1969). To this 
end, subpart (a) of Utah's Rule 11 provides that a 
defendant shall be represented by counsel before a 
plea is taken, unless counsel is waived, and subparts 
(b), (c), and (e) describe in detail the procedures for 
taking pleas of guilty or no contest. 
[6] A second purpose of Rule 11, aimed at 
preserving the integrity of the judicial process, is to 
insure that the record reflects that the plea was 
properly taken, i e, that the judge correctly 
determined the terms of the plea agreement and 
whether the plea was voluntary See, eg, United 
States v Roberts 570 F 2d 999 (D C Cir 1977). 
Thus, the rule delineates proper standards of 
conduct for trial courts in connection with plea 
bargaining, requiring them to determine whether a 
plea agreement has been reached between the 
defendant and the prosecution and, if so, the details 
of that agreement. U.C A., 1953, § 77-35-11(e)(6) 
(ReplVol. 8C, 1982, Supp 1985). In addition, the 
court must inform the defendant that it is not bound 
by the prosecutor's agreement to request or 
recommend a specific sentence Id Finally, Rule 11 
bars the trial court's participation in plea 
discussions "prior to any agreement being made by 
the prosecuting attorney" The rule provides, 
however, that after such an agreement is reached, 
the plea may be disclosed to the court, which may 
then indicate to both parties whether the proposed 
disposition will be approved. U.C.A., 1953, § 
77-35- 11(f) (Repl.Vol. 8C, 1982, Supp. 1985). 
That portion of the rule also provides that if the trial 
court thereafter decides not to adhere to the terms of 
the agreement, it shall so advise the defendant and 
allow the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the 
plea. [FN3] These provisions governing the trial 
court's conduct attempt to insure that the trial court 
will not improperly participate m the plea 
negotiations, the possible consequence of such 
participation being to render the plea involuntary 
and subject to subsequent attack. United States v 
Gilhgan, 256 F Supp. 244, 253 (S.D.N.Y.1966) 
Such participation may also undermine the judge's 
proper function as a neutral arbiter and transform 
him into *1300 an advocate for whatever proposed 
resolution the judge favors United States v 
Werker, 535 F 2d 198, 203 (2d Cir.1976), cert 
denied, 429 U S 926, 97 S.Ct. 330, 50 L Ed.2d 296 
(1976). 
FN3 This provision in the Utah rules 
differs from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure in that the Utah rule 
suggests that the trial court can withdraw 
from the plea agreement even after a guilty 
plea has been formally accepted and 
entered on the record. The federal rule, 
on the other hand, permits a court to accept 
or reject a plea that is conditioned upon an 
agreement as to a particular sentence 
Fed.R.Cnm.P 11(e)(3). If the court 
rejects the agreement, it must allow the 
defendant to withdraw the plea, if it 
accepts the agreement, it is generally 
bound to adhere to the terms of the 
agreement. United States v Blackwell, 
694 F.2d 1325, 1339 (DC Cir.1982). 
The federal rule does not allow a judge 
carte blanche authority to renege on a plea 
agreement after the agreement has been 
accepted. Id This power, apparently 
granted by the Utah rule, to withdraw from 
a plea agreement at any time should not be 
taken literally. In appropriate 
circumstances, due process and double 
jeopardy considerations will prohibit the 
judge from reneging on the agreement. 
See discussion in part III infra 
Understanding these general principles is useful in 
evaluating the State's contention that the trial court's 
violation of Rule 11 renders Kay's plea invalid 
The State argues that the trial court violated Rule 11 
in two particulars. First, the State contends that 
because Rule 11 expressly allows a defendant only 
to enter a plea of "not guilty, guilty or no contest," 
UC.A, 1953, § 75-35-11(b) (ReplVol 8C, 1982, 
Supp. 1985), by implication the rule does not permit 
the entry of a conditional guilty plea. Second, the 
State argues that the trial court participated in the 
plea agreement, contrary to the prohibitions against 
such conduct m Rule 11(f). The State asserts that 
both errors either require this Court to declare the 
guilty pleas a nullity or allow the trial court to 
proceed with sentencing without regard to the plea 
agreement. 
[7] We first address the State's argument that Rule 
11 prohibited the trial court from accepting a guilty 
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plea conditioned upon an agreement not to impose 
the death penalty Assuming aigaendo that the 
State acquiesced in the plea agreement, [FN4] 
nothing in the specific language of the rule prohibits 
a court from accepting or rejecting a plea agreement 
that asks the court to commit itself in advance to 
imposing a sentence lavvfully within its power 
[FN5] On the other hand, Utah's Rule 11 does not 
explicitly permit a judge to accept a guilty plea 
conditioned upon the imposition of an agreed-upon 
sentence It is one thing to say that Rule 11 may 
not contemplate the trial court's acceptance of a 
guilty plea conditioned upon a promise to impose a 
given sentence, or that such a practice is unwise as a 
general policy, and an entirely different thing to say 
that Utah's Rule 11 positively forbids it in all 
situations and that any resulting plea is void 
FN4 There is nothing in the record 
compiled before the trial court indicating 
that the State did not agree to the plea 
agreement See discussion in part III infra 
FN5 In fact, subpart (e)(6), which requires 
the judge to inform the defendant that the 
judge is not bound by any 
recommendations of the prosecutor as to 
sentence implicitly recognizes that the 
judge must be able to exercise broad 
discretion in sentencing Although 
subpart (e)(6) insures that the prosecutor 
cannot limit the trial judge's authority in 
sentencing it does not prohibit the judge 
from independently exercising his 
discretion to commit himself to imposing a 
particular sentence as a condition of a plea 
agreement 
Some cases under the old version of federal Rule 11 
held that the rule flatly prohibited a trial court from 
accepting a plea when the court made its intention 
respecting sentencing clear prior to acceptance of 
the plea See eg United States v Adams 634 
F2d 830, 836 (5th Cir 1981), United States v 
Werker sup) a 535 F 2d at 201 In these cases, 
however, the courts did not determine whether such 
a plea was automatically a nullity [FN6] 
Conversely, some courts held that the acceptance of 
a guilty plea conditioned upon an agreement to 
impose a particular sentence did not render the plea 
Copr G, West 2003 No ( 
invalid See Bordenkircher \ Haves 434 US 
357, 98 SCt 663, 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978), United 
States v Blackwell 694 F 2d 1325 (DC Cir 1982), 
Toler v Wxrwk 563 F 2d 372 374-75 (8th 
Cir 1977), ceit denied 435 US 907, 98 SCt 
1455, 55 LEd2d 498 (1978) The current version 
of Rule 11 in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which superseded the rule upon which 
Utah's Rule 11 is modeled, now explicitly 
recognizes that a court may entertain a plea bargain 
conditioned upon an agreement to impose a 
particular sentence, although the court retains the 
discretion to refuse to accept such a plea 
FedRComP 11(e)(2), 18 U S C (1983) The 
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice discussing a judge's responsibilities when 
accepting *1301 a guilty plea, recognizes that it 
may be both permissible and desirable for a judge 
to disclose a proposed sentence as part of the 
plea-bargaming process, so long as the judge acts as 
a moderator and not as an advocate III ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice § 14-3 3, at 84-85 
(2d ed 1980) 
FN6 In Adams the defendant had 
withdrawn his plea and proceeded to trial 
The appeals court held that he was entitled 
to be sentenced by another judge In 
Werker the state obtained, upon proper 
objection and appeal, a writ of mandamus 
to prohibit disclosure of the sentence to the 
defendant 
[8][9][10] Utah's Rule 11 provides no such specific 
guidance Under the circumstances of this case, 
however, we cannot find that the acceptance of the 
conditional plea was improper The policy 
considerations that have led some courts to hold in 
specific factual settings that it is improper for a 
judge to agree to impose a given sentence in 
exchange for the entry of a guilty plea are not 
present in this case The record before us leaves no 
question that Kay's pleas were voluntary Kay 
vigorously argues that the pleas were freely and 
knowingly given in an effort to avoid the death 
penalty The mere fact that Kay pleaded guilty to 
avoid a harsher penalty does not render an 
otherwise valid plea involuntary Eg Biadv v 
United States 397 U S 742, 749-50 90 S Ct 1463, 
1469-70, 25 LEd2d 747 (1970) As noted above, 
nothing in our Rule 11 explicitly prohibits the 
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acceptance of such a conditional plea, and we 
decline to read such a limiting provision into the 
rule. 
We turn to the State's second contention regarding 
Rule 11 It argues that the trial court's participation 
in the plea discussions rendered the pleas invalid, 
particularly where, as it contends occurred here, the 
trial court negotiated with Kay over the State's 
objection. Rule 11 specifically provides that "[t]he 
judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior 
to any agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney..." U C A , 1953, § 77-35-11(f) 
(Repl.Vol 8C, 1982, Supp.1985). The 
corresponding federal rule has always contained a 
similar provision Fed.R.Cnm.P 11(e)(1), 18 
U S C . (1983) 
[11][12] As we previously noted, the trial court's 
participation in plea negotiations is not to be 
encouraged; there is a very real danger that a trial 
court's participation will have a coercive effect upon 
a defendant. Certainly, a trial court's unilateral 
participation in a plea negotiation over a 
prosecutor's objection is highly improper. Despite 
the State's assertions to the contrary, however, there 
is no substantial record evidence that this occurred 
here. While Kay presented his agreement 
unilaterally to the judge, the State's attorneys were 
present during all discussions on the plea. Nothing 
in the record suggests that the State did not 
acquiesce m the agreement, nor does any record 
evidence suggest that the judge's actions coerced 
Kay into reluctantly entering the guilty pleas. For 
these reasons, we cannot hold that this violation of 
Rule 11 requires that the plea be declared a nullity. 
[13] A final word on the State's Rule 11 arguments. 
In its zeal to set aside Kay's guilty pleas or renege 
on the bargain that was struck, the State has argued, 
in effect, that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial coun 
violates any provision of Rule 11. The concurring 
opinions of Chief Justice Hall and Justice Howe 
adopt this reasoning as well. This position is 
shortsighted, for to follow it would be to sanction a 
remedy far worse than the wrong. If we were to 
hold that any violation of Rule 11 automatically 
voids the resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced 
after such a plea, to attack their convictions for 
purely tactical reasons, either by direct appeal or by 
Copr. © West 2003 No Cla 
seeking habeas corpus long after the fact [FN7] 
We have refused to overturn convictions upon such 
challenges in the past, e g, State v Knowles, Utah, 
709 P2d 311 (1985), State v Morris, Utah, 709 
P 2d 310 (1985), and we find no reason to 
encourage such attacks in the future 
FN7 No data is available for Utah 
specifically, but studies indicate that 
despite the proscriptions contained in the 
federal rules and in most state rules, 
judicial involvement in plea bargaining is 
widespread. Ill ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice § 14-3.3, at 84 (2d 
ed.1980) Thus, the potential for such 
attacks is substantial 
*1302 Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion-would require the State to 
reprosecute numerous defendants, probably long 
after the challenged guilty pleas were entered and 
when the passage of time would make reprosecution 
impractical, if not impossible. Almost certainly, 
the ultimate result would be to free a number of 
convicted persons for nothing more than technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary guilty 
pleas. 
[14][15] Having concluded that violations of Rule 
11 do not automatically invalidate Kay's guilty 
pleas, the question arises as to the consequences of 
Rule 11 violations Rule 30 of Utah's Rules of 
Cnminal Procedure, U C A , 1953, § 77-35-30(a) 
(Repl.Vol. 8C, 1982), reflects our "harmless error" 
rule, and we find it applicable to situations 
involving violations of Rule 11 [FN8] 
Accordingly, a Rule 11 error will not invalidate the 
plea taken unless the error results in a substantial 
violation of a party's rights. In the present case, we 
find no error that affects the substantial rights of a 
party and, as to which, an objection was timely 
raised. The State certainly had ample grounds for 
raising objections at the time the plea was taken, 
however, it waived those objections by its failure to 
raise them at the time the pleas were accepted 
Therefore, the Rule 11 violations cannot be a basis 
for our invalidating the pleas 
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FN8 In McCarthy v United States 394 
US 459, 89 SCt 1166, 22 LEd2d 418 
(1969), the Supreme Court suggested that 
any violation of federal Rule 11 rendered a 
guilty plea void Id at 471-72, 89 SCt at 
1173-74 The rule was thereafter 
amended to provide that variations from 
the procedures outlined in the rule should 
be disregarded unless the variation 
affected a defendant's substantial rights 
Rule 11(h), 18 U S C A (Supp 1985) 
The notes of the Advisory Committee on 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure state that 
subsection (h) was added to clarify the fact 
that the harmless error provision of Rule 
52(a) applied to Rule 11 violations We 
see no reason why the harmless error 
concept should not also apply to Utah's 
analogue to federal Rule 11 A party is no 
more entitled to a perfect plea proceeding 
than he is to a perfect trial See Warner v 
Morris Utah, 709 P 2d 309 (1985) (failure 
to follow letter of Rule 11 does not render 
plea void) 
III 
[16] We next turn to Kay's arguments concerning 
his rights under a broken plea agreement Kay first 
contends that any attempt to try him or sentence him 
without respecting the terms of the plea agreement 
will violate his rights under the state and federal 
constitutions not to be placed twice in jeopardy 
Kay relies on the almost universal recognition that 
jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a guilty 
plea, see eg Krmg v Missouri 107 US 221, 2 
SCt 443, 27 LEd 506 (1883), United States v 
Cruz 709 F 2d 111, 113 (1st Cir 1983), and that the 
entry of the plea, rather than the actual imposition 
of the sentence, is the critical moment for 
determining jeopardy See Annot, 75 A L R 2d 683, 
Stowers v State 266 Ind 403, 363 N E 2d 978, 982 
(1977) 
The State, in responding to this claim, relies on 
cases that have assumed, without directly 
addressing the question, that the State's failure to 
adhere to a plea bargain does not raise double 
jeopardy problems because the State's 
noncompliance simply renders the plea void ab 
initio The apparent reasoning of these cases is that 
a plea agreement based upon a promise which is 
Copr e West 2003 No ( 
later broken has been coerced and is therefore void 
See eg Santobello v New York 404 US 257 92 
SCt 495, 30 LEd 2d 427 (1971) (Douglas, J 
concurring), cf Machibroda v United States 368 
US 487, 493, 82 SCt 510, 513, 7 L Ed 2d 473 
(1962) Since jeopardy does not attach when a plea 
is void, these cases reason that the defendant may 
be tried without running afoul of the constitutional 
prohibitions against double jeopardy The ALI's 
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures § 
350-6 and the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure 
§ 444(e)(2)(m) make the same analytic assumption 
That analysis, however, is not entirely satisfactory 
In an attempt to avoid freeing *1303 defendants 
who plead guilty whenever the prosecutor or a 
judge later refuses to comply with the terms of the, 
plea agreement, these courts have resorted to the 
fiction that the plea never occurred-that it is "void 
ab initio " Yet at the time the plea was taken, it 
certainly may have been knowing and voluntary, 
and under accepted doctrine, nothing more is 
required to make jeopardy attach at the time the 
plea is entered This approach also has practical 
flaws While it permits a defendant to be retried, it 
places no constraints on the power of the State or 
the court to break a plea agreement with impunity 
For that reason, the courts have had to resort to 
notions of fundamental fairness under the due 
process clause to construct some necessary 
protections for the defendants' legitimate interests 
See part IV, infra 
The analytical and practical problems posed by the 
void ab initio approach have led some courts to 
reject it See eg United States v Williams 534 
F 2d 119, 121 (8th Cir 1976), cert denied 429 U S 
894, 97 SCt 255, 50 L Ed 2d 177 (1976), United 
States v Cruz 709 F 2d 111, 113 (1st Cir 1983), 
United States v Holman 728 F 2d 809 (6th 
Cir 1984), cert denied 469 US 983, 105 SCt 
388, 83 LEd2d 323 (1984), Myers v Fiazier 
WVa, 319 SE2d 782 (1984), cf People v 
Tourtellotte 88 Wash 2d 579, 564 P 2d 799 (1977) 
Because the entry of a plea constitutes a waiver by 
the defendant of a number of important 
constitutional rights, a trial court may not simply 
disregard a plea agreement unless the defendant 
knowingly waives his right to be free from jeopardy 
through a voluntary withdrawal of the plea See 
e g Stoweis v State supra 363 N E 2d at 982-83 
In view of the conflict among the lower federal 
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courts, the disparate state court positions, and the 
absence of a clear ruling by the United States 
Supreme Court, we do not feel compelled to adopt 
the strained void ab initio analysis Rather, we are 
persuaded by the First Circuit's reasoning in United 
States v Cruz, supra In Cruz, the trial court 
unconditionally accepted a defendant's guilty plea 
to a lesser charge, but later rejected the plea based 
upon information it later received in the presentence 
report. On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
trial court's rejection of the plea agreement and 
order that he stand trial placed him twice in 
jeopardy The First Circuit considered the void ab 
initio analysis and rejected it It also considered 
the possibility of finding that jeopardy did not 
attach until the sentence was pronounced, but 
rejected that alternative analysis for policy reasons. 
Finally, it settled on what we deem to be the most 
satisfactory analysis The court recognized that 
jeopardy attaches at the time the guilty plea is 
accepted. However, it reasoned that nothing 
inherent m the double jeopardy clause analysis 
forbids the trial court from setting aside the plea 
and forcing the defendant to trial under appropriate 
circumstances The Cruz court noted that although 
jeopardy attaches when a jury is impaneled, if 
thereafter a mistrial is properly declared, a 
defendant may still be retried without violating 
double jeopardy By a parallel of reasoning, the 
court concluded that double jeopardy ought not bar 
trial of a defendant if a guilty plea is set aside for 
sufficient reasons. Accordingly, the court stated: 
[J]eopardy attaches upon acceptance of the guilty 
plea, but [the constitution] allow[s] the trial court 
to rescind its acceptance at any time before 
sentencing and judgment upon a showing of 
"manifest necessity"--the standard for declaring a 
mistrial over the defendant's objection. 
709 F 2d at 114 [FN9] 
FN9 The First Circuit speculated that a 
weaker standard than "manifest necessity" 
might be appropriate where a plea was set 
aside, rather than a trial aborted, because 
double jeopardy considerations are "less 
implicated" when dealing with guilty pleas 
rather than full-scale trials However, the 
court did not have to consider this issue in 
depth because it based its decision to 
reinstate the plea on the lower court's 
direct violation of the federal rule in its use 
of the information in the presentence 
Copr g West 2003 No ( 
report. 
We consider the Cruz court's approach to double 
jeopardy to be sound and not so *1304 subject to ad 
hoc manipulations as the void ab initio analysis that 
fictionalizes coercion from the fact of a breached 
promise. Furthermore, it does not require 
subsequent resort to due process analysis to protect 
the legitimate interests of a defendant against 
capricious action by the court or the prosecution in 
refusing to abide by plea agreements. Cruz 
acknowledges that plea agreements are binding on 
the parties and the court once the plea is entered 
and accepted. If the court or the prosecutor refuses 
to comply with the terms of the plea thereafter, the 
defendant may choose to withdraw the plea. The 
trial court may not refuse to comply with the terms 
of the accepted agreement unless circumstances 
justify the declaration of a misplea; [FN 10] 
otherwise, the double jeopardy clause will preclude 
subsequent trial of that defendant. This means, in 
practice, that once the court or prosecution has 
entered into a plea agreement and that plea has been 
accepted and entered, neither one may unilaterally 
withdraw from the agreement without a showing 
that facts analogous to those warranting a mistrial 
exist (at least in the absence of a breach of the 
agreement by the defendant). This practical 
constraint should be sufficient to protect against 
capricious action by the State At the same time, 
by permitting the declaration of a misplea under 
appropriate circumstances, the legitimate interest of 
the public in assunng that criminal prosecutions are 
not frustrated by a clumsy application of the double 
jeopardy clause is protected. We therefore choose 
to employ the Cruz analysis m considering Kay's 
federal double jeopardy claim. 
FN 10. We recognize that Utah's Rule 11 
provides that "if the judge [after accepting 
a plea] decides that final disposition should 
not be handled in conformity with the plea 
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either 
affirm or withdraw the plea." It may be 
contended that this provision gives a trial 
judge carte blanche to withdraw from a 
plea bargain at any time However, it is 
elementary that neither rule nor statute 
may override a defendant's constitutional 
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy 
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If a court attempted to withdraw from a 
plea agreement over a detendant's 
objection and in the absence of 
circumstances warranting a misplea, 
constitutional prohibitions against double 
jeopardy would preclude his further 
prosecution 
The Cruz analysis also seems appropriate m 
applying the double jeopardy prohibition under 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
There is no Utah case law discussing when jeopardy 
attaches as a result of a guilty plea, nor is there any 
law as to when guilty pleas may be set aside without 
barring retrial, yet these questions are appropriately 
answered by Cruz Therefore, we apply the analysis 
used in Cruz in considering Kay's claims under 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, as well 
as under the fifth amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
Cruz does not deal in depth with the standard that 
should be met to justify setting aside a guilty plea 
and permitting subsequent trial of a defendant 
Thus, we must determine when the "manifest 
necessity" standard used m the federal courts or the 
"legal necessity" standard used in the Utah courts to 
determine when a trial judge may properly declare a 
mistrial over a defendant's objection should be 
applied to situations involving guilty pleas [FN11] 
FN 11 The Utah cases have referred to a 
"legal" or "special" necessity for granting a 
mistrial over a defendant's objection, rather 
than a "manifest" necessity—the 
phraseology used in the federal courts 
Our examination of the cases reveals no 
substantial differences between state and 
federal courts in the standards for granting 
a mistrial Compare United States v 
Perez 9 Wheat 579, 580, 22 U S 579, 6 
LEd 165 (1824), United States v Jorn 
400 U S 470, 485, 91 S Ct 547, 557, 27 
LEd 2d 543 (1970), Arizona v 
Washington 434 US 497, 505, 98 S Ct 
824, 830, 54 LEd 2d 717 (1978), with 
State v Thompson 58 Utah 291, 199 P 
161 (1921), State v Whitman 93 Utah 2d 
557, 74 P2d 696 (1973), State v 
Ambiose Utah, 598 P 2d 354, 358-59 
(1979), McNair v Haywaid Utah, 666 
P 2d 321, 324 (1983) 
It is generally accepted that a trial court may 
properly declare a mistrial upon its own motion and 
over a defendant's objection when an error occurs 
which will obviously compel reversal if the case is 
appealed, *1305 thus making further proceedings 
futile See eg Illinois v Somerxille 410 US 
458, 93 SCt 1066, 35 LEd 2d 425 (1973), 
Arizona v Washington 434 U S 497, 505, 98 S Ct 
824, 830, 54 L Ed 2d 717 (1978), State v Whitman 
93 Utah 2d 557, 74 P 2d 696 (1973), State v 
Ambrose Utah, 598 P 2d 354 (1979) Some 
courts in determining whether a mistrial should be 
granted, have used a balancing test the potential 
prejudice to the defendant from granting the mistrial 
and denying him his "valued right to have his trial 
completed by a particular tribunal" is weighed 
against "the public's interest in fair trials designed to 
end in just judgments " Wade v Hunter 336 U S 
684, 690, 69 SCt 834, 837, 93 LEd 974 (1949), 
leh'g denied 337 US 921 (1949), State v 
Ambrose supra This is to guard against the 
prosecution's inviting a mistrial by committing 
reversible error when it thinks that the case is going 
poorly and would prefer to try again before a new 
finder of fact See e g United States v Jorn 400 
US 470, 484-85, 91 SCt 547, 556-57, 27 LEd 2d 
543 (1971), State v Ambrose supra 
The granting of a misplea should be measured by a 
similar standard It is true, as the Cruz court noted, 
that double jeopardy considerations are not as 
heavily implicated in a plea bargain as in a trial 
setting 709 F 2d at 114 Nonetheless, in light of 
the double jeopardy problems, considerations of 
fundamental fairness permeate the cases involving 
mistrials Those considerations are equally 
applicable to plea bargains This is best illustrated 
by the fact that although the courts have erected few 
obstacles to the abrogation of plea bargains under 
the double jeopardy clause, they have resorted to 
the due process clause to accomplish the same end 
See Santobello v New York 404 U S 257, 262-63, 
92 SCt 495, 498-99, 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971), 
United States v Mack 655 F 2d 843 (8th Cir 1981), 
United States v Mercer 691 F 2d 343 (7th 
Cir 1982), Stowers v State supra 363 N E 2d at 
983 Therefore, it seems plain that a misplea can 
properly be granted where obvious reversible error 
has been committed in connection with the terms or 
the acceptance of the plea agreement and no undue 
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prejudice to the defendant is apparent Declaration 
of a misplea also seems reasonable in situations 
where some fraud or deception by one party leads to 
the acceptance of the plea agreement by the other 
party or the court There may be other 
circumstances where the balancing of the interests 
and legitimate expectations of the defendant and the 
public will also warrant a misplea, but we need not 
reach that question today 
Applying the foregoing standard, we do not find 
that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring 
a misplea and ordering Kay either to face 
sentencing or to withdraw his plea of guilty The 
trial court found that the conditional plea was 
illegal. As indicated earlier in this opinion, it was 
mistaken on this point However, Rule 11 certainly 
was violated, and had the prosecution timely 
objected, those violations would have been grounds 
to set the plea aside. The trial court also found that 
the State had been surprised by the proposed plea 
and had disagreed with it. There is little record 
support for that finding because most of the 
conversation relating to the plea was held off the 
record. However, the trial judge is certainly in a 
better position than we to know whether the 
prosecution disagreed with the proposed agreement. 
In light of these findings and the circumstances 
discussed below, we conclude that the errors 
committed by all parties provided ample support for 
the trial court's finding of the misplea. 
A brief factual review is warranted. Defendant's 
counsel initiated the series of errors when he 
proposed a plea bargain to the trial court without 
having first obtained the State's consent. Under 
Rule 11, the plea should not have been tendered to 
the judge unless the State had previously agreed to 
its terms. On the record before us, there is no 
evidence that the prosecutor at any time expressly 
agreed to the terms of the plea, much less that he 
agreed to the plea prior to its presentation to the 
judge. 
The trial court also erred by entertaining the plea 
After the motion to enter a plea *1306 was 
presented to it, and before proceeding with the in 
camera hearing, the court should have ascertained 
whether the prosecutor had agreed to the proposed 
plea If it determined that the prosecutor had not 
agreed in advance, the court should have terminated 
the hearing and any further consideration of the plea. 
Copr. g West 2003 No 
The problems created by defense counsel and the 
trial court were compounded by the prosecution A 
timely objection by the State would have prompted 
the judge to stop the proceedings and would have 
obviated the resulting problems In the very unlikely 
event that the judge refused to halt the proceeding, 
the State could have asked for a recess, contacted 
any member of this Court, and obtained a temporary 
stay of the plea proceeding pending procurement of 
a writ of prohibition See United States v Werker, 
supra, 535 F.2d at 201 The prosecution took none 
of the steps described. In fact, despite its current 
protestations, its actions at the time of the plea and 
confession suggest that it may have acquiesced in 
the plea bargain, although the trial judge seems to 
have expressly found to the contrary [FN 12] In 
any event, the prosecution's vacillating performance 
does not change our conclusion that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in declaring a "misplea" 
and setting the plea agreement aside. 
FN 12 While Kay tendered his motion for 
acceptance of the pleas unilaterally, the 
motion was discussed with the court and 
the State in chambers for over an hour. A 
recess was called, another short in camera 
proceeding was held with all counsel 
present, and proceedings were then held on 
the record. The State failed to object at 
any time during the record proceedings, 
despite the trial court's repeated inquiries 
to the State's counsel. The inference that 
can be drawn from this record, and from 
the State's subsequently raising the issue 
only after a new lead counsel's appearance 
and after defendant's open court confession 
had thoroughly inflamed the public, is that 
the State initially acquiesced in the plea 
agreement. Although the trial court found 
that the State was surprised by the 
conditional plea and did not agree to it, we 
are deeply troubled by the prosecution's 
conduct. 
IV 
Finally, we consider Kay's contention that 
considerations of fundamental fairness embodied in 
the due process clause of amendment XIV of the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution require specific 
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enforcement of the plea He argues that he acted in 
reliance on the promise that he would not be 
sentenced to death if he entered a guilty plea and 
gave a full confession The confession was given, 
and although it would not be admissible at a 
subsequent trial, it has provided the prosecution 
with a road map if he should now be forced to go to 
trial He contends that to require him to go to trial 
under such circumstances would be manifestly 
unfair, especially since he was induced to give the 
confession by the court's broken promise 
In Santobello v New York 404 U S 257, 262-63, 
92 SCt 495 498-99, 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971), the 
Supreme Court expressly recognized that, as a 
matter of due process, a defendant who pleads 
guilty has a constitutional right to a remedy when 
that agreement is broken However, the Court 
refused to decide whether the appropriate remedy 
should be withdrawal of the plea or specific 
enforcement, leaving that question for the state 
court to resolve based on the facts of the case Id 
Since Santobello numerous state and federal courts 
have considered the appropriate remedy for a 
broken plea bargain When a defendant has taken 
steps in reliance on a plea bargain that may 
prejudice him at a subsequent trial, many courts 
ha\e granted specific enforcement of the plea 
agreement See eg Santobello v New York 
supra United States v Mack 655 F 2d 843 (8th 
Cir 1981), United States v Mercer 691 F 2d 343 
(7th Cir 1982), United States v Blackwell supra 
694 F2d at 1337, Phillips v United States 679 
F2d 192 (9th Cir 1982), United States v Cruz 709 
F 2d 111 (1st Cir 1983), Stowers v State supra 
393 N E 2d at 983 We choose not to follow that 
route 
As noted earlier, the Cruz double jeopardy analysis 
can take adequate cognizance *1307 of the 
fundamental fairness concerns that are ordinarily 
brought into play under the due process clause in 
connection with broken plea agreements Those 
considerations were taken into account in our 
conclusion that the grant of the misplea was not an 
abuse of discretion There is no reason to reach a 
different conclusion under the due process clause of 
either the state or the federal constitution It is true 
that Kay confessed because of the plea agreement 
However, that confession certainly cannot be used 
at a subsequent trial since he was misled into giving 
it Kercheval \ United States 214 U S 220, 47 
SCt 582, 71 LEd 1009 (1927) This places Kay 
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in no different position than any other defendant 
who gives a confession that is later found not to 
have been knowing and voluntary The confession 
is excluded, but nothing precludes trial of the 
defendant The judge at a subsequent trial must 
assure that the prosecution makes no use of the 
confession or any evidence denved from it But 
the speculative value of a "road map" is not enough 
to preclude prosecution 
It must be borne in mind that Kay proposed the 
plea and the terms under which it was given In 
doing so, he acted in violation of Rule 11 and 
generated a number of the ensuing problems It 
would be anomolous to hold that because he and his 
counsel were able to draw the court and the 
prosecution into a proceeding in violation ot Rule 11 
, he is constitutionally entitled to the benefit of his 
bargain 
We have considered Kay's other contentions on 
appeal and find them to be without merit 
The case is remanded Kay may either withdraw 
the guilty pleas that were given as part of the 
aborted plea agreement and enter new pleas or he 
may choose to stand on his guilty pleas and proceed 
to sentencing under the provisions of section 
76-3-207 with no guarantee as to sentence 
DURHAM, J, concurs 
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring in the result) 
I join the Court in affirming the order of the trial 
court which vacated the condition imposed by the 
pleas of guilty However, I do not join the Court in 
its interpretation of the scope of judicial 
participation m plea bargaining 
Judicial participation in plea bargaining is 
expressly prohibited by Rule 11(f), Utah R Com P 
[FN1] which reads in pertinent part as follows 
FN1 U C A, 1953, §77-35-11(1982 ed) 
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea 
discussions prior to any agreement being made by 
the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea 
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agreement has been reached which contemplates 
entry of a plea in the expectation that other 
charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, 
upon request of the parties, max permit the 
disclosure to him of such tentatixe agreement and 
the reasons therefor in advance of the time for 
tender of the plea The judge may then indicate 
to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether he will approve the proposed disposition 
Thereafter, if the judge decides that final 
disposition should not be handled in conformity 
with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the 
defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw his plea 
(Emphasis added ) 
The foregoing statute does not encompass oi 
contemplate a role-change on the part of the judge 
On the contrary, the statute precludes the judge 
from becoming a plea bargainer, a role wholly 
inconsistent and in conflict with the role exclusively 
reserved to one who must sit in judgment This 
concept of the role the judge must play is further 
borne out by subsection (e)(6) of Rule 11 That 
rule provides that if recommendations as to 
sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court 
*1308 Utah's Rule 11 is patterned after Rule 11, 
Fed R Com P , which has similarly been interpreted 
as prohibiting judicial participation m plea 
bargaining In United States v Werker [FN2] the 
court had this to say about the role of the judge in 
plea bargaining 
FN2 535 F 2d 198 (2nd Cir ), cert denied 
429 U S 926, 97 S Ct 330, 50 L Ed 2d 
296(1976) 
Rule 11 implicitly recognizes that participation in 
the plea bargaining process depreciates the image 
of the trial judge that is necessary to public 
confidence in the impartial and objective 
administration of criminal justice As a iesult of 
his participation, the judge is no longer a judicial 
officer or a neutral arbiter Rather, he becomes 
or seems to become an advocate for the resolution 
he has suggested to the defendant 
The Rule is based on the sound principle that 
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the interests of justice are best served if the judge 
remains aloof from all discussions preliminary to 
the determination of guilt or innocence so that his 
impartiality and objectivity shall not be open to 
any question or suspicion when it becomes his 
duty to impose sentence [FN3] 
FN3 Id at 203 
In State v Jordan [FN4] the Arizona Supreme 
Court observed that under its rule [FN5] the "court 
shall not participate" in plea negotiations The 
court said that the sound reason for the rule was that 
set forth in Werker that a judge who participates in 
plea bargaining is thereby deprived of judicial 
status and can no longer perform as a neutral arbiter 
FN4 137 Ariz 504, 508-09, 672 P 2d 169 
173-74(1983) 
FN5 17 A R S Ariz R Com P , Rule 
17-4(a) 
U C A , 1953, § 76-3-206 provides that one 
"convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced in 
accordance with section 76-3-207, and sentence 
shall be death or life imprisonment as the court or 
jury, in accordance with this section, shall 
determine " 
Predicated upon the rule that prohibits judicial 
participation in plea bargaining, U C A , 1953, § 
76-3-207(1) (Supp 1985) mandates that a 
"sentencing proceeding" follow the entry of a plea 
of guilty or conviction of a capital felony That 
section reads in pertinent part as follows 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been 
found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be 
further proceedings before the court or jw\ on 
the issue of sentence In the case of a plea of 
guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing 
proceedings shall be conducted by the court 
which accepted the plea or by a jury upon request 
of the defendant 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence 
may be presented as to any matter the court 
deems relevant to sentence, including but not 
limited to the nature and circumstances of the 
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crime, the defendant's character, background, 
history, mental and physical condition, and any 
other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the 
penalty 
(Emphasis added) 
It does not he withm the prerogative of the court to 
disregard the mandate of a sentencing hearing The 
court is required to consider the evidence to 
determine whether the penalty to be imposed is that 
of death or life imprisonment Furthermore, 
agreeing to be bound to impose a life sentence in 
advance of a sentencing hearing constitutes 
prejudgment of the issue of sentencing It is an 
arbitrary and injudicious act which violates the 
holding m Fwman v Georgia [FN6] that the 
decision to impose the death penalty shall not be 
left to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries 
FN6 408 US 238, 92 S Ct 2726, 33 
L Ed 2d 346(1972) 
In light of the explicit statutory procedures to be 
followed m capital felony cases, it clearly appears 
that the defendant led the trial judge into error by 
engaging him *1309 in a unilateral plea bargain 
arrangement whereby pleas of guilty were 
exchanged for a promise of life imprisonment The 
manifest error rendered the guilty pleas void ab 
initio and not merely voidable The court was 
without power to accept the conditional pleas The 
pleas were therefore void and without legal effect 
The pleas were not binding, and either party was 
free to withdraw from them Consequently, the 
acceptance of the pleas did not place the defendant 
in jeopardy within the meaning of the sixth 
amendment to the United States Constitution or 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution Not 
having been placed in jeopardy, the defendant may 
be tned on the charges to which the void pleas were 
entered Of course, on remand, defendant has the 
option of proceeding with a sentencing hearing or 
standing trial on reinstated pleas of not guilty 
The main opinion boldly asserts, without 
documentation, that judicial involvement in plea 
bargaining is widespread in this jurisdiction I am 
not so persuaded, particularly because no such 
instances of judicial impropriety have surfaced in 
any of the cases previously decided by this Court 
However, even assuming that such impropriety is 
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indeed prevalent, I deem it far more appropriate to 
squarely meet the issue rather than sanction the 
practice as "harmless error" and simply hope that 
the evil will go away 
STEWART, Justice (concurring in result and 
concurring in the opinion in part) 
I concur in Parts I and II of the plurality opinion, 
and I concur in the result of the opinion but on 
somewhat different grounds The key question in 
this case is not the validity of the defendant's plea of 
guilty, but the enforceability of the condition 
attached to the plea The trial judge made an 
agreement with the defendant that he would plead 
guilty to a capital homicide charge and in return the 
trial judge would sentence the defendant to life 
imprisonment, a lawful sentence in a capital 
homicide case The trial judge has now reneged on 
that agreement and given the defendant the choice 
of either withdrawing his guilty plea and pleading 
not guilty or of standing on his plea of guilty and 
going to a penalty hearing to determine whether he 
will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment 
The defendant seeks to have the Court direct the 
trial court to sentence the defendant to life 
imprisonment pursuant to the terms of the 
agreement 
The issue is whether due process requires the trial 
court to perform the agreement and sentence the 
defendant to life imprisonment In Santobello v 
New York, 404 U S 257, 262, 92 S Ct 495, 498, 30 
LEd2d 427 (1971), the Supreme Court held with 
respect to a plea bargain broken by the government 
that it is for the state courts to determine whether a 
defendant is entitled to specific enforcement of the 
plea bargain or whether he is only entitled to 
withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial on the crime 
charged 
In the instant case the condition attached to the 
defendant's guilty plea was proposed by the 
defendant, not the prosecutor or the trial judge 
Although it was the defendant who was the prime 
mover in the whole affair, the prosecution clearly 
acquiesced in the agreement, at least as far as the 
record shows Nevertheless, I submit that the trial 
judge's decision to refuse to enforce the condition of 
the plea was not error in these circumstances Rule 
II of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states 
that even after a plea bargain has been accepted by 
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the court, "if the judge decides that final disposition 
should not be handled in conformity with the plea 
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and thus 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw 
his plea " A number of reasons justify giving the 
trial judge such discretion up to the time of 
sentence But after sentence has been pronounced, 
the trial judge may not then rescind the sentence, 
absent fraud or failure of the defendant to abide by 
the terms of the agreement I do not believe that 
this rule violates the Due Process Clause under the 
ruling in Santobello at least on the facts of this case 
*1310 If the defendant withdraws his guilty plea, as 
he may do under the trial court's order, he waives 
his right against double jeopardy and is no worse 
off than he was before he sought to protect himself 
from the death penalty by his aborted plea bargain, 
except that he has given a confession, which, for 
reasons explained by Justice Zimmerman, is not, in 
my view, prejudicial 
HOWE, Justice (concurring in the result) 
I concur in the result While I agree with much of 
the "misplea" analysis of the majority opinion, I 
prefer to rest my concurrence on the ground that 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
does not authorize a plea agreement between the 
defendant and the judge concerning the sentence to 
be imposed Subsections (e)(6) and (f) of that rule 
provide 
(e)(6) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney 
or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser 
included offense, or the dismissal of other 
charges, the same shall be approved by the court 
If recommendations as to sentence are allowed 
by the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court 
(0 The judge shall not participate in plea 
discussions prior to an agreement being made by 
the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea 
agreement has been reached which contemplates 
entry of a plea in the expectation that other 
charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, 
upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure to him of such tentative agreement and 
the reasons therefore in advance of the time for 
tender of the plea A judge may then indicate to 
the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
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whether he will approve the proposed disposition 
Thereafter, if the judge decides that final 
disposition should not be handled in conformity 
with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the 
defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw his plea 
It is to be noted that these subsections authorize 
only plea agreements between the prosecution and 
the defendant for the entry of a plea to a lesser 
included offense in the expectation that other 
chaiges will be dropped or dismissed There is 
nothing m the language of the subsections which 
would authonze a plea agreement with the 
prosecution or the judge based on the sentence to be 
imposed To the contrary, subsection (e)(6) states 
that if in the disclosure to the court, a 
recommendation as to sentencing appears, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court 
The agreement made by the trial judge here to 
impose a life sentence is not authorized by Rule 11 
and thus is not enforceable by either the defendant 
or the court Furthermore, even if the agreement 
were authorized, the last sentence of Rule 11(f) 
gives the judge the right to rescind his approval of it 
before sentencing Thus, I conclude that the judge 
was free to withdraw from the agreement prior to 
the time that sentencing was actually pronounced 
Due process, however, demands that the defendant 
who was lead into pleading guilty upon the 
sentencing agreement of the judge now be allowed 
to withdraw his plea should he so desire United 
States v Gilhgan 256 F Supp 244 Should the 
defendant elect to do so, the trial court can take 
such prophylactic measures as are necessary to 
afford the defendant a fair trial untainted by 
knowledge of the making and withdrawal of the 
guilty plea 
This result, i e that the agreement is unenforceable 
(but not void) and that the trial judge may withdraw 
from any promise made as to sentencing before 
sentencing is actually pronounced, will not bring 
about the mischief feared by the majority opinion 
A defendant who has been sentenced in accordance 
with a judge's plea agreement has no complaint 
He has received the benefit of an executed 
agreement and would not be freed for mere 
technical errors The trial judge here was *1311 
fortunate to have detected his error before 
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sentencing and should be allowed to withdraw from 
his commitment provided he restores the defendant 
to his original position without prejudice 
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